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WAR AND PEACE IN HIGHLAND PNG: 
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEBILYER VALLEY, 
WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCE
INTRODUCTION 
The Highlands have long been regarded 
as the most fight-prone part of Papua New 
Guinea, and the Nebilyer Valley (shown near 
the centre of Map 1) as one of the most 
fight-prone parts of the Highlands. For as 
far back as anyone can tell there have been 
considerable differences in the scale and 
intensity of warfare within different parts of 
the valley. Until recently, the most deadly 
conflict had long been the one between the 
two largest tribes in the valley, who live on 
the fertile, densely populated valley floor; the 
Ulka, and their western neighbours, the Kulka 
(shown on the righthand side of Map 2). For 
as long as living memory or oral history can 
attest, these two tribes have been major 
enemies. Over recent decades, they fought 
in the 1970s, in the mid 1980s, and from 
1993-1995; during the latter two periods with 
high-powered automatic rifles instead of bows 
and arrows and spears, destroying much 
property including a community school and 
police station that have never been rebuilt, 
and killing over a hundred people. During all 
of that time, and right up until 2005, conflict 
in the central Nebilyer Valley contrasted 
sharply with the course of events in the 
western Nebilyer Valley where I have been 
doing anthropological field research (partly in 
collaboration with Francesca Merlan) on and 
off since 1981. 
During the entire period from about 1950 
to 2005 the Kopia and Kubuka tribes, with 
whom we have lived at Kailge, were not 
involved in any lethal warfare. They were 
on the verge of it in 1982 when they joined 
in with their eastern neighbours - the Epola-
Alya and others - in a fight that had broken 
out between them and their neighbours to 
the south, the Tea-Dena. This conflict (for 
reasons discussed in Merlan & Rumsey 
1991) became known as the Marsupial Road 
War (see Map 3). But that war was stopped 
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Map 1. The Nebilyer Valley and nearby areas in the 
Highland Papua New Guinea
Map 2. Tribes in the Western Nebilyer 
Valley
by a dramatic intervention by a 
local women’s group who marched 
out on the battlefield between 
the opposing sides and broke it 
up. That intervention established 
a peace that lasted 23 years. 
This changed dramatically in 
2005 when the Kopia and Kubuka 
people got into the biggest fight 
that they had experienced in living 
memory in which approximately 
80 people were killed over then 
period 2005-2007. Here I give an 
account of how that turn of events 
took place, use it to illustrate what 
I see as some general features 
of the socio-political order in this 
region, and try to develop some 
conclusions about the problems 
and prospects for conflict 
resolution there and in Highland 
New Guinea more generally. First, 
I’ll present some background 
regarding the region and its forms 
of social organization.
Many aspects of social life 
among the Ku Waru people 
have been, and continue to be, 
organized in terms of named social 
units called talapi, a term which 
can be roughly translated as ‘tribe’ 
or ‘clan’1. These are territorially 
distinct units, each of which owns 
and occupies a single, contiguous 
Map 3. Sides in the Marsupial Road War 
of 1982
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block of land within the western 
Nebilyer Valley (such as the 
one shown for the Kopia tribe 
in Map 4). Within each tribe 
there are internal subdivisions, 
each of which is identified 
with a sub-region within that 
larger block. This is illustrated 
by Map 4, which shows the 
internal subdivisions of Kopia 
territory as of 1986 and the 
territories of the neighbouring 
tribes. The subdivisions of each 
tribe are organised into multi-
leveled branching structures of 
a kind known to anthropologists 
as ‘segmentary’ structures. 
These are illustrated in Figure 
1 (following page), which shows 
the segments of the Kopia 
tribe2. With approximately 600 
members, Kopia is a relatively 
small tribe by Western-
Highlands standards, with 
a correspondingly simple 
segmentary structure; three 
levels of internal subdivision. By 
comparison, the Kulka and Ulka 
tribes referred to above each 
have well over 5000 members, 
and at least six levels of internal 
subdivisions. 
WARfARE, 
COMPLEMENTARY OPPOSITION 
AND INTERGROUP ExCHANGE
One of the aspects of social life in which 
these segmentary structures continue to 
figure strongly across much the Western 
Highlands is warfare. For any given pair of 
groups, the more closely related they are 
within a branching segmentary structure, the 
stronger are:
1. the sanctions against their engaging in 
warfare with each other.
2. the mechanisms for settling disputes so 
as to insure that they don’t escalate into 
open warfare.
3. the obligation to join in with the other 
groups as their allies in case a war breaks 
out between them and another unrelated 
or more distantly related group.
Segmentary systems of this kind - or with 
this degree of elaboration at least - are not 
commonly found elsewhere in Papua New 
Guinea or other Melanesian locales, but are 
(or were) common in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where they were extensively studied by 
anthropologists in the 1930s, 40s and 50s. In 
the African systems that were the subject of 
such classic studies as Evans-Pritchard’s The 
Nuer (1940) and Bohannan and Bohannan’s 
(1953) The Tiv of Central Nigeria, a key 
principle on which the systems were said 
to be organized was that of ‘lineage’. In this 
context subdivisions of the social groups were 
understood to be related to each through 
descent from common ancestors at various 
generation levels. When anthropological 
studies of Highland New Guinea began in 
earnest in the 1950s and 60s, researchers 
were struck by the similarities between 
the segmentary social systems they found 
there, and the African ones described in 
the earlier studies. At first this led them to 
overplay the similarities and neglect some 
Map 4. The Kailge area and territorial distribution 
of named segmentary groups there as of 1986
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key differences, such as the fact that in 
most parts of highland New Guinea people 
don’t keep track of their ancestors beyond 
two or three generations back, and by and 
large, construct their segmentary relations 
on other bases than genealogical ones. 
As often happens in academia, this was 
followed by a strong swing of the pendulum 
in the opposite direction - in this case one 
which began with a judicious critique of the 
over-reliance on ‘African Models in the New 
Guinea Highlands’ (Barnes 1962) and ended 
up with more extreme one in which not only 
those models but the very notion of ‘social 
group’ on which they rested was deemed 
inapplicable to the New Guinea Highlands 
(Wagner 1974)3.
This is not the place for a detailed critique 
of that more extreme position, and recasting 
of the notion of the ‘segmentary’ that I believe 
can help to shed light on political processes in 
the Highland PNG (for which see Merlan and 
Rumsey 1991:34-45). Suffice it to say here 
that the classical ‘African models’ include 
several different features which, while treated 
by their critics as all of piece, are logically 
independent of each other; and that some 
of them are in my view highly applicable to 
social processes in Highland PNG, while 
others are not.
One of the features which is highly 
applicable is the principle of ‘complementary 
opposition’. A good first approximation of 
what this entails is to say that it is a way of 
summing up the practical tendencies stated 
in 1) – 3) above. The Africa-based work in 
political anthropology that I have referred to 
included an elegant and useful formal model 
of complementary opposition which I think is 
worth laying out here for interested readers. 
Those who are put off by formal models can 
take note of the first approximation above 
and skip the next three paragraphs.
The principle of complementary opposition 
is illustrated in schematic form in Figure 2, 
which is taken from a classic account of the 
subject by Evans-Pritchard (1940) in his book 
on political organization among the Nuer 
of southern Sudan. The squares labeled 
‘A’ and ‘B’ in the figure correspond to two 
tribes, each of which is internally sub-divided 
in the manner shown for B by the divisions 
into X and Y, X1 and X2, etc. According to 
the principle of complementary opposition, 
as stated in hypothetical form by the Nuer 
themselves (according to Evans-Pritchard), 
when groups Z1 and Z2 fight no other group 
gets involved. But if Z1 fights with Y1, Z1 and 
Z2 unite as Y2. When Z1 fights X1, Y1 and Y2 
unite and so do X1 and X2. And so on, up the 
segmentary scale to the level at which even 
A and B may unite when A raids the Dinka, 
who are enemies of the Nuer in general. 
The applicability of this principle to inter-
group politics in the Nebilyer Valley can be 
illustrated by comparing Figure 2 to Figure 
1 showing the subdivisions within the Kopia 
tribe as discussed above, and considering 
them in relation to the following case. Early 
in 1982 a serious dispute broke out within the 
this tribe, between the Kabika sub-group and 
the Araim, over moves taken by a leading 
Kabika big man, Silka, to build a house for 
himself and his family in the area between 
figure 1. Segmentary divisions within 
the Kopia tribe.
figure 2. Schematic representation of 
principle of complementary opposition 
from Evans-Pritchard (1940: 144).
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the Luip and Ukulu Rivers immediately to the 
south of the Kailge Display Ground as shown 
near the lower right hand corner of Map 4, 
and to fence off a portion of the land there 
to use as a sweet-potato garden. Until then 
that area had been used by the Araim Kopia 
as commonage on which to put their pigs to 
pasture. The dispute was argued out on a 
nearly daily basis for several months, growing 
ever more heated until, by May of that year 
some of the Araim Kopia were openly urging 
armed attacked on the Kabika – albeit with 
sticks rather than bows and arrows and 
spears. But this dispute quickly faded into the 
background during the next month when the 
Kopia tribe became involved in the war with 
the Tea Dena to the south. At around the time 
when the first battle of that war was fought, 
Silka quietly went ahead and began building 
his house, unopposed by Araim4.
In terms of the formal model of 
complementary opposition shown in Figure 
2, Kabika is equivalent to Z1, Galka to Z2 
No Pengi to Y1, Araim to X, Kopia to B and 
Tea Dena to A. A comparison between the 
events described in the previous paragraph 
and the hypothetical scenario set out in the 
one before it shows that those events would 
not have completely predictable in terms 
of the model, but that they were broadly 
consistent with it. For example, given the 
identifications I have made above, according 
to the model one would have expected 
that when the dispute broke out between 
Kabika and Araim, all of Wiyal would have 
joined in with Kabika against Araim. But it is 
consistent with the model in that the other 
segments of Wiyal did not join with Araim, 
and in that the conflict between Kabika 
and Araim was suppressed when the Kopia 
tribe as a whole came into conflict with 
Tea-Dena. It is in these elaborately ramified 
segmentary structures and associated 
patterns of complementary opposition that the 
indigenous systems of social organization of 
the PNG Highland regions discussed in this 
paper are most similar to the ones in Africa 
that were described by Evans-Pritchard and 
Bohannan.
A point of difference, however, is that in 
the New Guinea Highlands there are also 
systems of inter-group wealth exchange, 
whereby, for example, each of the tribes 
referred to above (Kopia, Kubuka and Tea, 
Dena) has exchange relationships with one 
or two others in the area, of the kind known 
as makayl (the more well-known, Melpa 
word for which is moka). Until the 1960s, the 
main items in these exchange transactions 
were live pigs and gold-lip pearlshells. Live 
pigs continue to be as important as ever in 
the transactions, but pearlshells have been 
replaced by money.
Each talapi also has relations of alliance 
and hostility with others in the area. There is 
a sliding scale among these relations, such 
that, for example, tribes A and B can be 
enemies of each other for some purposes 
but allies of each other relation to common 
enemy tribe C (compare for example the 
relation between Britain and the Soviet Union 
vis à vis Nazi Germany in World War Two). To 
describe what is happening in cases of this 
kind Andrew Strathern has coined the terms 
‘major enemies’ and ‘minor enemies’5. In 
these terms, tribes A and B in my hypothetical 
example above are minor enemies of each 
other, and both together are major enemies of 
C. These are relative terms, as shown by the 
fact that, for example, a conflict may develop 
between C and an alliance consisting of D, E 
and F, whereupon C recruits A and B to fight 
on its side as allies. In Strathern’s terms the 
‘major’ enmity between A+B and C becomes 
a ‘minor’ one relative to their shared enmity 
with D+E+F.
Now let us consider the relationship 
between these patterns of military alliance 
and hostility, and the makayl exchange 
relationships mentioned earlier. Like the 
Melpa (Strathern 1971) Ku Waru people 
say that all makayl exchange relationships 
have originated in previous bouts of tribal 
warfare. This has happened in two ways. 
To understand them one needs to know 
a little more about the way in which tribes 
are brought into war. When an alliance of 
tribes, call them A, B, and C, fights another, 
D, E and F, they do not fight each other as 
undifferentiated blocks. Rather, one of the 
tribes on each side is considered to be a 
principal ‘owner’, ‘cause’, ‘base’ (pul) of the 
fight. The fight is viewed as having originally 
broken out between A and D, for example, 
and these tribes are seen to be primarily 
responsible for it, and for bringing other tribes 
into it to fight on their side. The recruitment 
itself usually happens in stages, whereby, for 
example, in the first stage A recruits B and D 
recruits E; and the second stage B recruits C 
and E recruits F.
The way in which wealth exchange 
comes into the picture is that each of these 
acts of recruitment must be followed up by 
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compensation payments among the allied 
tribes on either side. Tribe B has to pay 
compensation to tribe C arising from injuries 
and deaths they may have incurred in the 
fight, and tribe A must similarly compensate 
tribe B. Likewise on the other side D must 
compensate E and E must compensate 
F. This is represented at ‘1’ on Figure 3, 
which shows the simplest case of this kind 
of compensation, where there are only two 
allied groups on either side of the fight.
Any of these transactions between 
the pairs of tribes in such a scenario may 
give rise to makayl ceremonial exchange 
relations. This happens when the exchange 
which was initiated by an act of warfare gets 
converted to a back-and-forth flow of wealth 
items. For example, the payment by to B to 
C in the above scenario may be reciprocated 
years later by a payment from C to B. This 
payment should be larger than the one it is 
reciprocating (the earlier one from B to C). 
Years later there may be another payment in 
the other direction again, from B to C which 
should be larger again, and so forth.
The other way in which warfare gives rise 
to exchange relationships is when the ‘fight 
owners’ in such a scenario, in this case C 
and D, agree to pay compensation directly 
to each other arising from the deaths and 
injuries that each has inflicted on the other. 
This too may give rise to a continuous series 
of escalating wealth exchanges between 
these two tribes.
 
This latter kind of exchange relationship 
– the one arising from direct compensation 
between the belligerents – is far less frequent 
than the other kind, involving compensation 
among allies. And in almost every case where 
it has occurred, it has been in a context where 
the donor and recipient groups are jointly 
opposed to another tribe or coalition, against 
which they are seeking to form an alliance. 
In other words, it is has almost always been 
transacted between minor enemies in the 
context of joint opposition to a common major 
enemy6 - shown at ‘2’ - on Figure 3.
Ku Waru people do not explain these 
compensation payments as direct recompense 
for the blood that has been shed or the lives 
lost. In fact they often remark in their orations 
at the exchange events that no amount of 
money or wealth can pay for the life of a 
man. Rather, they say that they are paying 
to compensate for the anger and grief that 
people suffer from the injuries and deaths.
In view of the above discussion it can 
be seen that the exchange of wealth and 
the exchange of blows in a sense comprise 
two different aspects of a single system 
(cf. Rumsey 2003). Each wealth transaction 
between clans or tribes creates or strengthens 
an alliance between them, but at the same 
time poses a threat to their common enemies, 
who can read it is an act of provocation. 
Relations of hostility, such as that between C 
and D above, can be converted to relations 
of alliance by exchanges of wealth; but by the 
same token relations of alliance such as that 
between B and C can be converted to ones 
of hostility by the failure to exchange wealth, 
or the failure to give as much as expected in 
terms of the requirement for increment7. 
THE RECENT WAR AND ITS 
ROOTS
Now let us turn to the specifics of the 
2005-7 fight. For reasons which will become 
clear below, this fight has become known as 
the ‘Poison War’ (kupena el). It developed 
out of a dispute between the Kopia-Kubuka 
and their neighbours to the south, the Tilka 
(see Map 5). In order to understand how 
and why it developed, it is important to know 
that the Kopia and Kubuka tribes have been 
allies for as long as anyone can remember, 
but that until about forty years ago they 
had been enemies of all the other tribes 
immediately to the east of them and nearly 
all those to the south: Kusika, Midipu, Epola, 
Alya, Lalka (hereafter referred to as K-M-E-
A-L), Tea and Dena, as shown on Map 6. In 
the 1940s there was a war in which all those 
figure 3. Schematic representation of 
types of intergroup compensation arising 
from warfare
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tribes fought against Kopia-Kubuka and their 
allies from over the Tambul Range: Mujika-
Lalkuwu, Poika-Palimi and Engal-Kanibe. In 
that war the Kopia were regarded as the el 
pul or ‘owners’ of the fight on one side, and 
the Tea-Dena in the other. 
By 1973, when a community school for 
the whole region was built at Kailge, in 
Kopia territory, peaceable relations had 
been established between Kopia-Kubuka 
and K-M-E-A-L. Indeed, in recent accounts 
of that period it has been emphasized that 
the building of the school was one of the 
main reasons why peace was made among 
those groups, all of whom were to send 
their children to it. But the relations between 
the ‘owners of the fight’, Kopia-Kubuka and 
Tena-Dena (who were also included within 
the school district) remained tense into the 
1980s.
The only neighbours of the Kopia-Kubuka 
with whom they had not had hostile relations 
at any time in the remembered past were the 
Tilka. I am not certain how long ago the first 
Tilka people settled in the area to the south 
Kubuka territory, but it is clear that at least 
some land in the northern part of it that region 
had previously been Kubuka territory was 
given to Tilka precisely because they were 
at the time a non-aligned group with respect 
to the old enmity between Kopia-Kubuka 
and Tea-Dena, thereby further consolidating 
the status of Tilka country as a buffer zone 
between the two.
In 1982 there was a big shift in political 
relations in the region. In July of that year 
the war broke out that I have referred to 
above, between the Tea-Dena and their 
former allies the Epola-Alya. The Tea-Dena 
recruited the Tola-Wanaka to fight on their 
side. On the other side the Epola-Alya were 
joined by their old allies Kusika, Midipu and 
Lalka, but also by their former enemies the 
Kopia-Kubuka, who were recruited as allies 
by the Kusika-Midipu. The resulting sides in 
that war are shown in Map 3. As it turned out, 
the 1982 war was not a major one, thanks to 
the woman’s intervention that I have referred 
to above (for further details of which, see 
Merlan and Rumsey 1991: 156-197, Rumsey 
2000).
Building in part on that successful act 
of peacemaking, many new initiatives were 
taken over the next fifteen years which not 
only ended the remaining hostilities between 
the warring sides, but resulted in the creation 
of a formal alliance then known as the 
Faipela Kansil – a coalition of people in the 
five local-government council areas which are 
associated with all those groups. This alliance, 
also known as Hapwara8, was sealed by a 
series of wealth exchanges, beginning with 
the payment of compensation by the Kopia-
Kubuka to their allies in the 1982 war, and 
entering a new phase in the late 1990s with 
Map 5. Sides in Poison War of 2005-7. Map 6. Sides in the war fought in the late 
1940s (the Kopia and Kubuka tribes were 
joined by Mujika-Laulku and two other 
tribes to the east who are not shown on 
the Map.)
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the initiation of makayl ceremonial exchange 
relations between tribes that had fought on 
opposite sides of it as major enemies: Tea-
Dena and Kopia-Kubuka. At the time this was 
seen as an exciting new development in that 
it was the first occasion that anyone in the 
area could recall in which compensation was 
paid between the two sides in a war rather 
than between the allied tribes on either side 
(for details see Rumsey 2003). Previously, in 
keeping with the discussion above, this had 
only happened in cases where the warring 
sides were joining to fight another tribe or 
alliance which was a common enemy of both. 
That is, in terms of Figure 3, all previous 
cases had been of type 1 or 2 rather than 
of type 3. Alternatively, rather than thinking 
of this is a case of type 3, we can think of 
it as a case of type 2 in which the common 
enemy (as represented by the large circle at 
the top of the diagram) was understood to be 
warfare itself – which both sides were keen 
to prevent in view of what was happening 
between the neighbouring Kulka and Ulka 
tribes, who had been engaged in highly 
lethal warfare during the 1980s and 90s as 
described above.
Unfortunately the faivpela kansel alliance 
did not include the Tilka. This seems not 
to have been due to any animosity against 
them, but to the fact that even though the 
Tilka were living in the western Nebilyer 
valley between the Kubuka and Tea-Dena, 
their main connections were to the east, with 
the Kulka. 
In 2003 a dispute arose between Tilka 
and Kopia over the death of a Tilka man, 
Alfred Alima, who, at his mother’s urging, 
had been given medicine by a Kopia man, 
John Iki, who had been working at the 
Mt. Hagen Hospital. Alima is said by some 
Kopia-Kubuka people to have been HIV 
positive and may have died of AIDS. But the 
Tilka blamed it on the medicine and held the 
Kopia responsible for the man’s death. While 
not necessarily accepting this view, the Kopia 
paid compensation to the Tilka to assuage 
their anger, as is customary in such cases.
In 2005 a Kubuka man named Robert 
Wambu died. The Kubuka claimed that he 
had been poisoned and blamed the Kopia 
for it. The two men who were said to have 
administered the poison were a man from 
lower (Araim) Kopia who was married to 
a Tilka woman and a man from upper (No 
Pengi) Kopia whose mother was a Tilka. Not 
all Kopia accepted this account of Robert 
Wambu’s death. Some of them claim that 
just prior to it he had been bingeing for a 
solid week on OP (over-proof) rum, and that 
that was really what killed him. Nonetheless 
they agreed to make a placatory payment, 
to Kubuka. The two Kopia men who were 
charged with the poisoning are said to have 
confessed to it, but apparently this was 
forced at gunpoint. In any case they were 
severely beaten by other Kopia, after which 
they fled the community and are still living in 
exile as of 2009. But the ultimate blame was 
placed on the Tilka, who were said to have 
given the poison to the two Kopia men via 
the Tilka mother of one and wife of the other. 
This was thought to have been done by the 
Tilka in revenge for the earlier death of Alfred 
Alima.
Since the Tilka were deemed ultimately 
responsible for the death by most Kopia and 
Kubuka, compensation was demanded from 
them. They refused to pay it, pointing out that 
the slain man’s mother was a Tilka woman, 
so why would he have been killed by her own 
kind? Nonetheless, the Tilka were pressed 
for compensation. One day as all this was 
going on, and a group of Kopia people were 
gardening at Sibeka, a Tilka man reportedly 
tried to shoot at them, and they were saved 
only by the fact that his gun misfired. When 
they came back to Kailge and reported this, 
a large band of Kopia and Kubuka went and 
attacked the Tilka, driving them from their 
territory and burning all their houses. They 
fled to Kulka territory. Kulka then joined 
them as allies, and in counter-response to 
that escalation, the K-M-E-A-L joined Kopia-
Kubuka. This made a big difference because 
neither the Kopia-Kubuka nor the Tilka had 
any guns at that time, but both Kulka and 
K-M-E-A-L did. 
Over the next 18 months, there were 
several battles and the battle line shifted 
back and forth, at times deep in Kulka 
territory and at other times deep into K-M-
E-A-L and Kopia-Kubuka territory. All the 
houses, school buildings and aid post at 
Kailge were destroyed and only the two 
churches – Catholic and PNG Bible Church 
– were left standing. On the Kulka side, all 
houses on the western side of the Nebilyer 
River were destroyed and all the residents 
driven out. Most of them, and most of the 
refugees from Tilka as well, have settled with 
the Kulka who live on the eastern side of the 
Nebilyer. Altogether about 40 people were 
killed on each side.
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As of January 2009 when I visited Kailge, 
there had been no fighting for a little more 
than a year, but it was still not considered 
safe for people from any of the Hapwara 
groups to travel through Kulka territory. This 
meant that they could not use the only 
vehicular road with a bridge across the 
Nebilyer River that connects the Hapwara 
area to the outside world. Therefore the area 
has been for most purposes inaccessible by 
car since 2005. But a new walking track had 
been put in that that allows Hapwara people 
to get to the Highlands Highway, including a 
new footbridge.
The school at Kailge had not operated 
since 2005. Plans were being made to get 
it started up again for the 2009 school year, 
and I subsequently learned that this has 
happened, albeit in temporary shelters, with 
very limited teaching materials. 
Because of the fighting my visit to Kailge 
in January of 2009 was my first to the 
area since 2004 (after having visited there 
nearly every year between 1997 and 2003). 
During the interim I had keeping up on local 
developments as best I could through phone 
conversations, work with Kailge people 
in Goroka, a visitor from Kailge in 2007, 
and email contact with Douglas Young, the 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Mt. Hagen. 
My contact with Douglas Young over the last 
several years has developed over a shared 
interest in trying to support efforts by Western 
Highlanders in warfare-affected regions to 
make peace. He has long experience in 
work of this kind, and a keen theoretical and 
comparative interest in the subject as well a 
thoroughly practical one, having done a PhD 
in Conflict Resolution at Macquarie University 
based on his work Enga Province9. 
THE 2009 PEACE BUILDING 
WORkSHOP
When Douglas Young heard from me that 
I was coming to Mount Hagen in January of 
2009, he invited me to join him in a workshop 
on tribal fighting and peacemaking, with 
special reference to the recent fight in the 
Nebilyer. At first he had thought of this 
primarily as a workshop for parish priests 
and other church personnel, to allow me to 
share and exchange perspectives with them 
about the fighting and how to contribute 
to peacemaking. But as our plans for the 
workshop developed, especially in view of 
the fact that the fighting had been dormant 
for some time by then and leaders on both 
sides of it seemed ready to talk, we decided 
to invite them to participate as well. Written 
invitations were sent to three of the elected 
village Councillors on either side of the fight. 
The workshop was held on 21 January, 
2009 in a meeting room on the grounds of 
Repiamul Catholic Mission in Mount Hagen. 
It was attended by 38 people, including five 
of the six invited councillors and five other 
men who had been involved in the fighting. 
All of the discussion was conducted in Tok 
Pisin, the only language common to all the 
participants. Archbishop Douglas opened the 
workshop with some remarks about the how it 
was related to previous peace-building efforts 
in the region, including an ecumenical action-
research project called ‘The Churches and 
Peacebuilding’10 and a current campaign in 
the Western Highlands called ‘Tok nogat long 
vailens na pasin birua’, ‘Say no to violence 
and hostility’. He stressed that the main aim 
of the workshop was not to serve as a forum 
for the negotiation of a peace a settlement 
but rather, to help us understand the conflict. 
While we hoped that this would help build 
the foundation for a future settlement, we 
considered it premature to try to broker one 
here. Nor was the occasion to be considered 
an inquest for the purpose of determining 
who was to blame for what had happened. 
It was simply to improve our understanding 
of the conflict and share ideas about how 
to resolve it. This was followed by a Bible 
reading (Matthew 5:9, Ol man i save mekim 
dai ol kros na fait, em oli ken amamas, bai oli 
kolim em pikinini bilong God…), and a prayer 
in which God was asked to help workshop 
participants deal with each other in a spirit 
of reconciliation. Each of us then introduced 
ourselves.
 
I was then asked to give the opening 
presentation on the recent fighting in the 
Nebilyer Valley. I began with a review of the 
background to the fight as presented above. 
Using those events as an example, I then set 
out some general points which I think were 
already familiar to most of the participants, 
but which I wanted to get on the table for 
discussion. Since they may be less familiar 
to some of the readers of this paper, I will 
summarize the main ones, most of them very 
briefly, but the first of them from a broader 
comparative perspective than would have 
been appropriate for the workshop.
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CONCLUSIONS
That first concluding point I made at 
the workshop is one that I have stressed 
above, namely, the continuing absolute 
centrality for people in this region of the 
named segmentary groups to which everyone 
belongs. This has been stressed by many 
anthropologists and other social scientists, 
but especially by indigenous ones from the 
region such as John Muke (1993), Joseph 
Ketan (2004), and Andrew Lakau (1994). 
This is of course true of some other areas 
of PNG besides the central and western 
highlands, but those latter areas are unique 
within PNG for the sheer size of the groups 
and the extent of their internal ramification. 
In the Mount Hagen region for example it is 
not uncommon to find named groups with 
5,000-10,000 members and seven or more 
levels of internal subdivision within them. In 
keeping with the principle of complementary 
opposition that I have discussed above, 
this provides a built in potential for small 
local conflicts to escalate into large regional 
ones, such as we have seen the case of the 
Nebilyer one that I have described. 
In the way this escalation is modelled 
in classical segmentary lineage theory, it 
is treated as a matter of conflicts between 
lower-level groupings that escalate to become 
ones between large groupings. In the case 
of the Poison War of 2005-7 as described 
above something else is involved as well: 
the projection outward of conflicts within the 
lower-level groupings. This is exemplified by 
the way in which a conflict that had begun to 
develop between the closely allied Kopia and 
Kubuka tribes was transformed into one in 
which Kopia and Kubuka were jointly opposed 
to Tilka. That transformation had two aspects 
to it. First, rather than supporting the two men 
accused of poisoning Robert Wamu, their 
fellow Kopia accepted the Kubuka account 
of what had happened and turned on the two 
men, in effect expelling them from the area. 
Second, while accepting the claim that those 
men had been in on the poisoning, rather 
than allowing all of the blame to be attributed 
to them, their fellow Kopia identified the Tilka 
as its ultimate source. This in effect allowed a 
potential conflict between Kopia and Kubuka 
to be projected outward, on to the preexisting 
one between Kopia and Tilka – ultimately 
with disastrous consequences.
A similar turn of events lay behind the 
‘Marsupial Road War’ of 1982 that I referred 
to above, which was said have started as a 
dispute between a Tea man and a Dena one, 
Peam, who then left the Dena area to live with 
his in-laws among the Epola, some of whom 
then attacked a Tea man in retaliation for the 
Tea’s treatment of the Peam11. Both in these 
kinds of cases involving outward projection 
and the ones involving the more usual sort 
of complementary opposition as discussed 
earlier, we see conflicts becoming amplified 
in ways that are especially facilitated by the 
kinds of segmentary group structures that 
are found in the Western Highlands region, 
and by people’s strong commitments to them 
as a key aspect of their social identity.
The second general point is that, if we 
are going to think about the payment of 
compensation as a form of conflict resolution, 
we have to pay close attention to what it 
is being paid for, and to the nature of the 
relations between donor groups and recipient 
ones as shown in Figure 3. That is, it makes 
all the difference in the world whether the 
payment is being made between: 1) groups 
who have fought on the same side, i.e. 
between a ‘fight source’ group and its allies; 
2) groups who have fought against each 
other and are paying compensation to build 
an alliance against a common enemy group; 
or 3) groups who have fought against each 
other and paying compensation to end the 
fighting and assuage their anger with each 
other, but without a common enemy in view. 
These three different scenarios have very 
different potential consequences – 1) and 2) 
being understandable as a ‘zero-sum game’ 
with respect to the balance of probabilities 
between war and peace12 while 3) is in 
principle more conducive to peacemaking 
per se.
Third, when trying to promote peacemaking 
efforts here as elsewhere in the world it is 
important to recognize the crucial role played 
by persons and groups who are what is 
called in Tok Pisin namel, ‘in the middle, ‘in 
between’. More than merely ‘neutral’, these 
are persons or groups who have an active 
interest in the welfare of people on both 
sides of the fight, and therefore in helping 
them try to put an end to it. Kulka and Tilka 
men for example were able to play this role 
vis à vis the opposing sides in the Marsupial 
Road War of 1982. The Kulka Women’s 
Group was able to play it to an even greater 
extent, in part because they were identified 
with Kulka (many by marriage rather than 
birth), but also because they were women, 
who are in general positioned as ‘in between’ 
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with respect to the groups who fight the 
wars – named segmentary groups such as 
the ones discussed above (cf. M. Strathern 
1972, Merlan and Rumsey 1991:156-97, 
Rumsey 2000). At the workshop I pointed 
out that women’s groups have played this 
kind of role to a greater extent elsewhere in 
Papua New Guinea, perhaps most famously 
in the Bougainville Peace Process (Sirivi 
and Havini 2004). Since Francesca Merlan 
and I have found that men in the Nebilyer 
Valley readily recognize the potential value 
of women’s position in this respect, and 
generally speak approvingly of the Kulka 
women’s action in the Marsupial Road War, 
I challenged those at the workshop to think 
about why such actions are relatively rare in 
the Highlands and about what could be done 
to provide more scope for it.
A related point concerning the namel 
position is one that has one that has been 
well developed in the literature on conflict 
resolution (e.g. Young 2004), namely the 
importance of appealing to common interests 
shared on both sides of the conflict. A good 
example of this is the way in which the Kulka 
Women’s Group drew on the fact that their 
raison d’être was business and economic 
development – something that everybody 
wanted. When the women marched onto 
the battlefield between the opposing sides 
they brought with them trade goods they 
had bought with the proceeds of their cash-
cropping activities and distributed them to 
the men on both sides, pointing out to them 
in no uncertain terms that tribal warfare was 
inimical to such activities, and that was one 
of the reasons why they should lay down 
their arms.
Another local example of the importance 
of the recognition of common interests is 
the observation I have reported above that 
people made in relation to the putting aside 
of old hostilities between Kopia-Kopia and 
other tribes in the region as a condition for 
establishing the first school in the area at 
Kailge in 1973. In the wake of its destruction 
in 2006, the headmaster of that school came 
to see me with a delegation the day before 
the 2009 workshop to impress on me how 
important it was for the peace process that 
the school be rebuilt, as a resource for the 
future that people would be loathe to put at 
risk by fighting again.
Finally on the subject of namel, I stressed 
that perhaps the single most effective force 
of this kind over much of Papua New Guinea 
– and certainly in the Nebilyer Valley – are 
the churches. The workshop itself was an 
obvious example, hosted as it was by the 
Catholic Church, in the context of the ongoing 
Catholic and wider ecumenical peace-
building programs that were referred to by 
Archibishop Douglas in his opening remarks. 
At the ‘grassroots’ level, on my visit to Kailge 
I heard about a peace ceremony that had 
been conducted by Catholic and PNG Bible 
Church leaders a few weeks before among 
men who had fought on the Hapwara side. At 
the workshop two of the Kulka speakers from 
the other side told of an Evangelical Christian 
‘Crusade’ meeting that had been conducted 
in the Kulka heartland in December of 2007 
at which the Kulka belligerents had vowed to 
not to fight any more. Both of these events 
helped prepare the way for January 2009 
workshop, which was the first time when 
leaders from both sides had come together 
and made the same pledge to each other. 
During the fighting itself, the special status of 
the churches in this and other respects was 
tacitly but powerfully acknowledged by the 
church buildings having been left untouched 
when the rest of the Kailge was routed by the 
Kulka and Tilka.
Still as of the time I am writing this 
discussion paper in October of 2009, there are 
three remaining obstacles to long-term peace 
in the Western Nebilyer region that remain to 
be resolved. The first is that, in keeping with 
the protocols I have described above, there 
are massive amounts of compensation that 
remain to be paid by the ‘fight source’ groups 
to their allies. A second obstacle is that both 
sides are still armed with automatic rifles and 
– so my friends on the Hapwara side tell me – 
prepared to use them if conditions take a turn 
for the worse. Third, there is the fact that the 
Tilka have been driven off their land and that 
it has been occupied by Kubuka people with 
no intention of ever allowing them to come 
back (as opposed the to hapwara Kulka area 
with is being kept unoccupied with a prospect 
left open of allowing the Kulka to return to it if 
relations improve).
This third point leads to a question that 
I will briefly consider here. Was the fight 
really about land? So far, given my long-term 
identification with Kopia, I have not had a 
chance to discuss this matter with any of 
the Tilka people who were routed from their 
land. The Kopia and Kubuka people who 
routed them and have moved onto that land 
never say that the prospect of doing so was 
why they fought with the Tilka, attributing 
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it instead to the alleged poisonings I have 
discussed above. But it seems more than 
fortuitous that one of the main stirrers in favor 
of fighting was a man who had ceded a good 
deal of his land to Tilka back when it was 
useful to have them in a neutral buffer zone 
between him and Tea-Dena to the south; and 
that the fighting between Kopia-Kubuka and 
Tilka broke out only after that had ceased to 
be the case, owing to the peace that been 
established between Tea-Dena and Kopia-
Kubuka.
In the literature on New Guinea warfare 
and local politics generally there has been 
much discussion of the question of whether 
or to what extent the need for land has 
been a cause of tribal warfare. Partly under 
the influence of Mervyn Meggitt’s writings 
on the subject (Meggitt 1977), at one time 
‘land pressure’ was widely believed by 
anthropologists and government officials to 
be an important causal factor, especially 
in the most densely populated parts of the 
Highlands such as the central Enga region 
where Meggitt had done his research. 
More recently this view has been strongly 
contested, not least by scholars from the 
Highlands such as Kundepen Talyaga (1978) 
and Andrew Lakau (1995) and from Enga 
region – who claim that there is adequate 
land for everyone’s use throughout the area 
– and Joseph Ketan from the Melpa region 
who argues that a far more important factor 
is competition for renown for one’s group, as 
encapsulated in the name of his excellent 
book The Name Must Not Go Down (Ketan 
2004). These scholars are no doubt right that 
the way in which warfare and land pressure 
had been thought to be linked in the earlier 
accounts was too direct and simplistic. But 
before ruling it out altogether in this case 
I would want to canvas the issue with the 
vanquished as well as the victors.
My talk at the workshop was followed by 
many outpourings of sorrow over the fighting, 
exhaustion, self criticism for it, and an 
agreement for the leaders to go back to their 
constituencies to plan a peace settlement. 
This is still in train. Overall, the workshop 
was successful, showing the real potential of 
churches to play a namel role. A condition of 
its success was its timing. It came just when 
the combatants were ready for it – thoroughly 
exhausted by the fighting, with by then a 
roughly equal number of casualties on both 
sides. 
Given the remaining obstacles I have 
pointed out above it is by no means certain 
how long the current peace the Nebilyer 
Valley will last, or whether the dispute that 
gave rise to the war can be resolved. But 
the likelihood of its breaking out again in the 
near future was almost certainly reduced by 
the workshop. More generally, along with 
Douglas Young, I hope that some lessons 
were learned there which can be applied 
in the other parts of the Western Highlands 
from which most of the participants came – 
and perhaps more widely still by readers of 
this discussion paper.
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ENDNOTES
1 See Merlan & Rumsey (1991: 34-45) for 
some important qualifications on the use 
of these terms, and for further details 
concerning the nature of talapi. Following 
Strathern (1971, 1972) we use the term 
‘tribe’ for the most inclusive named socio-
territorial groups in the area.
2 Any such figure is for certain purposes 
too simple as it represents as static 
structures what are actually dynamic pro-
cesses, with, at any given time, rather 
more structural indeterminacy than is 
captured by Figure 1. For a fuller, more 
delicate account of Kopia segmentation 
which takes account of this indeterminacy, 
see Merlan & Rumsey (1991: 34-56). For 
present purposes Figure 1 is adequate.
3 Both in its title and in its introduction, the 
publication in which Wagner presents 
this critique (Wagner 1974) is framed as 
though it is meant to apply to the New 
Guinea Highlands in general, but the 
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question is addressed entirely on the 
basis of evidence from a single region, 
Karamui, on the southern edge of the 
central Highlands. The social organiza-
tion of the Daribi people that Wagner 
studied there is very different from the 
segmentary organization that is found in 
the Western Highlands region discussed 
in this paper, so his argument is not really 
relevant for the latter, although it is often 
read that way. Conversely, I urge my 
readers to bear in mind that the kind of 
segmentary organization described in 
this paper is only found in certain parts of 
the Highlands, by no means all of them. 
4 As shown on the Map 4 at the locale 
referred to above. For further details of 
these and subsequent developments, 
see Merlan & Rumsey (1991: 50-52).
5 These terms correspond closely to indig-
enous Melpa and Ku Waru terms which 
draw this distinction in terms of kind of 
feathers worn on the battle shields when 
fighting. Major enemies are el parka yi-ma 
‘Red Bird of Paradise men’.
6 Likewise, Andrew Strathern reports for 
the Melpa area that: ‘Informants at Mbukl 
[his field site] maintained that in the past 
no war payments were made to major 
enemies, only to minor enemies, with 
whom it was expected that peace could 
be made and who might be one’s allies 
in a different fight sequence of fights later 
(Strathern 1971: 90). Meggitt (1977) says 
the same thing about the Mae Enga.
7 Unambiguous testimony on this point is 
provided by the Melpa big-man Onga in 
the film ‘The Kawelka’ (in the ‘Disappear-
ing World’ series made by Granada Tele-
vision). When asked what would happen 
if he did not succeed in pulling off the 
moka event he was trying to organise 
Ongka replied, only half jokingly, that in 
that event his exchange partners would 
take him behind the house and slit his 
throat.
8 This is a Tok Pisin term meaning roughly 
‘on one side of the river’ – in this case 
referring to people to the west of the Nebi-
lyer River. For further details concerning 
this alliance and its relation to national-
level electoral politics in the region, see 
Rumsey (1999).
9 A revised version of his thesis has been 
published as Young (2004). See also 
Gibbs & Young (2007).
10 As reported on in Gibbs & Young 2007, 
which is available online at http://www.
pngcpp.org.au/pngcpp/restricted/docu-
ments/Peace%20Building%20final.pdf 
11 For further details see Merlan & Rumsey 
(1991).
12 For an example of failure by a govern-
ment official to recognize this difference 
when trying to promote peacemaking in 
the Nebilyer Valley, see Merlan & Rumsey 
(1991: 179).
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